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Abstract 
 
The paper sheds some light on  the emergence of the euro as a key international 
currency two years since its inception. It looks at the main stylised facts 
concerning the use of the euro as an anchor, as a reserve asset, as a private 
financing and investment currency, and for pricing and invoicing. It then moves 
on to discuss the implications of a large, economically and monetarily integrated 
area in Europe for the architecture of the world monetary system and the 
evolution of international monetary affairs. One of the prominent issues here is 
whether Economic and Monetary Union in Europe makes the process of 
international policy coordination easier or more difficult. 
 
Further, the paper suggests that the extent to which the euro will be able to 
play an international role will depend to a large degree on its ability to become a 
pole of attraction for a wider economic region, in Europe and beyond, 
particularly for developing countries. It is argued that the preconditions for such 
an outcome already exist and will become stronger over time. The trade and 
financial channels through which EMU and the adoption of the euro affect 
economic activity and structure in third countries are analysed by distinguishing 
European countries that are in the process of becoming EU members and other 
countries that maintain close economic and historical ties with EU members. 
 
Finally, the analysis is focussed on the economic, financial and currency 
relationships the Mediterranean countries are likely to develop with EMU 
nations as the euro gains importance and EMU progresses towards deeper 
integration. 
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The creation of the euro has been the most important change in the international 
monetary system after the collapse of the Bretton Woods regime in 1971. This 
paper sheds some light on the emergence of the euro as a key international 
currency two years since its inception; secondly, it offers some conjectures on 
the implications of the creation of a large, economically and monetarily 
integrated area in Europe for the architecture of the world system, taking 
account of the new economic and financial environment as well as of the novel 
structure of interactions among policy actors in the international arena; thirdly, it 
explores the implications of the euro and of deeper integration in the European 
Union for the economic, financial and currency relationships between Europe 
and the Mediterranean area. 
 
The issues explored in the paper are organized around four central 
questions: 
 
- Is the euro becoming a key international currency? 
-  Does Economic and Monetary Union in Europe (EMU) make 
international policy coordination easier? 
-  Will the euro become a pole of attraction for a wider economic area, in 
Europe and beyond? Under what conditions? 
- What implications will the euro have for Mediterranean countries? 
 
 
2.  THE EURO AS AN INTERNATIONAL CURRENCY 
 
We define an international currency as a currency which is accepted and used as 
a means of payments, store of value and unit of account by economic agents or 
institutions residing in a country other than that where the currency is issued. 
Table 1 presents the standard taxonomy of the functions of an international 
currency, distinguishing the type of agents (private or official) using it. 
 
 As the table shows, the international use of a currency has several 
dimensions, all of which are closely interrelated and tend to be mutually 
reinforcing. For example, if a currency is widely used in trade invoicing, agents 
will tend to issue and hold financial instruments denominated in it, in part to 
hedge against the exchange risk of future outlays and receipts. If there is a high 
volume of financial transactions in a currency and this is used as a vehicle 
currency, this will tend to increase the liquidity of markets and to lower 
                                                           
* This paper was presented at the Second Mediterranean Social and Political Research 
Meeting, Florence, March 21-25, 2001, Mediterranean Programme, Robert Schuman Centre 
for Advanced Studies, European University Institute. 
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country’s trade and financial transactions with the rest of the world is 
denominated in a currency, that country will have an incentive to set its 
exchange rate policy with reference to that currency, and will tend to hold 




Taxonomy of functions of international currencies 
 
Money function  Private use  Official use 
Medium of exchange  Payment/Vehicle currency (*) 
(i)  in exchanges of goods and 
services 
(ii)  in currency exchange 
Intervention currency 
Store of value 
 
Investment/Financing currency  Reserve currency 
Unit of account 
 
Pricing/Invoicing currency  Anchor currency 
 
Source: IMF 
(*) Transactions in which two currencies are not exchanged directly, but through a third 
currency ("vehicle"). 
  
Two preliminary considerations are in order at the outset. 
 
First, normally there is some degree of inertia in monetary history such that 
the time span in which currencies become key international currencies may be 
rather lengthy. In the case of the euro there are no historical antecedents to the 
birth of a single, transnational money that comes into being as a substitute for a 
multitude of existing national monies. This very discontinuity might possibly 
speed up the international use of the euro. This will in turn depend on two chief 
characteristics: the size of the underlying economy (see Table 2) and the speed 
of the move from nationally segmented financial markets to a single, integrated 
and deep European financial market. 
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2 Population  Openness
3 
USA  21.9 14.0  4.6 13.3 
Euro  area  15.8 16.2  4.9 15.4 
Japan  7.6 6.7 2.1 9.1 
 
Source: IMF 
1)  In PPP terms. 
2)  Exports of goods and services. For the Euro area, excluding intra-area trade. 
3)  Imports of goods and services as a percentage of country or area GDP. 
 
 
Second, the speed at which the international use of a currency increases may 
vary in relation to the different functions it performs: the process may be slower 
for the “vehicle-currency” function since it involves economies of scale which 
tend to change with some inertia and for the use as a reserve asset, whereas it 
may be speedier for the use as a  private financing and investment currency. 
 
 
3.  SOME OBSERVED FACTS 
 
3.1     The euro as an anchor  
 
A large variety of exchange rate regimes adopted by countries currently involve 
a link   to the euro in some form or another. According to data compiled by the 
European Central Bank  (see Table 3),  more than 50 countries peg more or less 
closely their currencies to the euro. Those countries are clustered in Central and 
Eastern Europe (chiefly, “accession” countries), in the Mediterranean area and 
in Africa. They are, to a large degree, countries that have close trade and 
financial links with the euro area. Yet, the aggregate share in world GDP of 
countries linking their currencies to the euro or for that matter to the dollar is 
relatively small. Moreover, the dollar remains the only currency to which a 
number of countries located outside its “region” anchor their currency. The 
currencies that gravitate around the yen are limited in number both locally and 
globally. All in all, currency pegs or anchors are to a predominant degree 
“regional” in character, although it is difficult to discern a clear trend towards a 
“tripolar” (i.e. euro, dollar, yen) set of currency relationships in the world. 
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Exchange rate regimes involving a link to the euro 
or to a basket of currencies including the euro 
 
Exchange rate regime  Number of countries  Countries 
Exchange rate arrangements 
with no separate legal tender 
5  French territorial communities of 
Saint-Pierre-et-Miquelon and 
Mayotte. 
The Republic of San Marino, the 
Vatican City and the Principality of 
Monaco will be entitled to use the 
euro as their official currency 
subject to an agreement with the 
European Union. Negotiations are 
currently in place with Monaco, 
and have been concluded with San 
Marino and Vatican City. 
Currency board arrangements  3  Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Estonia 
Peg arrangements (including 
pegging to the SDR and other 














Pegging only to the euro: Cyprus, 
Denmark, 14 African countries of 
which the CFA franc is the legal 
tender, Cape Verde, Comoros 
Pegging to the SDR: Latvia, 
Bahrain, Botswana, Jordan, Libyan 
Arab Jamahiriya, Myanmar, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates 
Pegging to other currency baskets 
including the euro: Iceland, Malta, 
Bangladesh, Burundi, Chile, 
Morocco, Seychelles, Vanuatu 
Crawling fluctuation bands  3  Hungary, Israel (basket), Tunisia 
Managed floating with the euro 
used as a reference currency 
6  Burundi, Croatia, Czech Republic, 
FYR Macedonia,  Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia 
  Total:     52   
 
Source: European Central Bank 
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At the end of 1999, according to IMF data, the euro accounted for 12.5 per cent 
of world official reserve holdings of foreign exchange (see Table 4). The euro 
share of world reserves  was roughly identical to the combined sum of its 
constituent parts (the predecessor European currencies) one year earlier, once 




More recent data tend to confirm that no significant changes in the share 
of the euro in world foreign currency reserves have occurred. In fact, in 2000 for 
G-10 countries the share of the euro was unchanged relative to that of the 
constituent national currencies at the end of 1998 (around 16 per cent). For non-
oil developing countries, the share of the euro – around 13 per cent – had 
increased as compared with the pre-EMU situation (10 per cent). Among the 
candidate countries for entering the European Union – the so-called “accession 
countries” – the euro accounted for a very sizeable share of their official 
reserves (nearly 50 per cent, in excess of the US dollar, and on a slightly 
increasing trend). Conversely, the dollar remains the predominant currency in 
the reserves of both Latin American and oil exporting countries’ monetary 
authorities. 
 
Overall, the prevailing attitude among official holders of reserves seems 
to be one of “wait and see”, although some, e.g. the Hong Kong monetary 
authority, have stated their intention to increase significantly the share of the 
euro in their total reserves. Such attitude is consistent with inertia in reserve-
holding habits. The currency composition of central banks’ reserves is slow to 
change because habits are slow to change. And central banks are hesitant to 
bring about radical changes in their portfolios for fear that this will signal a lack 
of policy continuity. 
 
                                                           
1 First, at end-1998 the Eurosystem converted back into gold and US dollars the official ECUs 
that had been issued to EU central banks through revolving swaps against the contribution of 
20 per cent of their gross gold holdings and US dollar reserves during the operation of the 
European Monetary System. Second, with effect from 1 January 1999, the Eurosystem’s 
reserves previously denominated in former euro-area national currencies and private ECUs 
became domestic assets. 
RSC 2001/34 © 2001 Giorgio Gomel  7Table 4 
Share of National Currencies in Official Holdings of Foreign Exchange 
(end of year, in percent) 
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The increase in the international use of the euro as a financing currency by non-
residents of the euro zone, in particular in the area of international debt issuance, 
represents the most important and novel development in regard to the 
internationalization of the euro. 
 
According to the BIS definition, which captures the truly “international” 
component of debt issues denominated in euros, i.e. securities denominated in 
euros issued by borrowers who are non residents of the euro area plus euro-
denominated securities issued by euro-area  residents, but where the targeted 
investors are non-euro area residents, in 1999 euro-denominated gross issues of 
debt securities – money market instruments, bonds and notes –  accounted for 38 
per cent of total issues of international debt securities. This compares with 26 
per cent of total gross issuance accounted for by the aggregate share of the 
former euro-area national currencies and the ECU in 1998.   
 
The development has been the result of the interplay of demand and 
supply-driven factors: on the one hand, greater breadth, depth and liquidity of 
financial markets in Europe moving away from national segmentations towards 
a unified, integrated European market. On the other, growing market size and 
the obvious attraction of a currency composition of external debt with a larger 
share of a weak currency 
2. In other words, a peculiar instance of a successful 
market and a not-too-successful exchange rate going together! 
 
The more telling currency shift is the one shown by sovereign borrowers 
outside Euroland. Since January 1999 these outside governments have issued 13 
per cent of their international debt in euros compared with 4 per cent in the 
predecessor currencies during the earlier period in the 1990s.
3 Among industrial 
country issuers that have launched large amounts of euro-denominated debt are 
Greece, Denmark and Canada. Among emerging market countries, the largest 
issuers include Argentina, Mexico, South Africa, Brazil. To borrowers, the 
attraction of the euro arises from the fact that it represents the world’s second 
largest government bond market. The conversion of government debt in eleven 
national currencies into a single currency created a market that surpassed in size 
Japan’s. At end-September 2000, the euro-area stock of government bonds 
denominated in euros amounted to euro 3.4 trillion. 
 
                                                           
2 This conclusion goes hand in hand with the anectodal evidence pointing to European 
companies issuing debt securities in euro, then converting those proceeds into US dollar funds 
to be subsequently invested in the US economy.  
3 Total  international debt is measured here by the sum of euro and US dollar-denominated 
bond issues. 
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borrowers. Between January 1999 and September 2000 euro-area private-sector 
borrowers issued 72 per cent of their debt in euro, compared with 10 per cent in 
national currencies in the pre-EMU period in the 1990s.
3 Borrowers residing 
outside the euro-area issued 21 per cent of their debt in euros, compared with 2 
per cent in the previous period.
 3 
 
Concerning banks and other deposit-taking and loan-making institutions, 
official ECB statistics 
4 show that non-euro area residents’ deposits in euros and 
loans extended to non-euro area residents in euros account for roughly 40 per 
cent of total, a slight increase from the pre-EMU levels. 
 
From the standpoint of the use of the euro as an investment currency, 
statistical information is scant. Overall, the advent of the euro seems to have had 
modest effects on the currency composition of international investments so far, 
as both bank asset stocks and  international portfolios of bonds and equities 
indicate. In mid-2000 the stock of international bank assets denominated in euro 
was roughly 20 per cent of the total as compared with a dollar share exceeding 
50 per cent. In bond and equity holdings by major international investors, the 
euro ranks second to the dollar as the most widely used currency; while the 
dollar accounts for roughly 50 per cent of total holdings, the euro share ranges 
between 20 and 30 per cent according to the specific assets in question. 
 
 
3.4     The euro as a pricing and invoicing currency 
 
The US dollar retains its predominance as a currency of pricing/invoicing in 
homogeneous and standardized international markets, such as those of primary 
commodities, of which several Mediterranean countries are major exporters. An 
established international currency benefits from positive externalities, stemming 
from lower transaction and information costs and network effects. Over time the 
creation of a euro area whose share of world trade is larger than that of the 
United States will make the euro more attractive as a vehicle and invoicing 
currency. But the attraction of shifting to the euro is a function of how many 
other market actors also shift. There is little incentive to be first. This lends the 
international role of currencies a strong element of inertia.  
 
Only modest shifts in producers’ behaviour have lately been recorded: Iraq 
and Jordan switched to the euro in pricing and invoicing their petroleum exports. 
 
 
                                                           
4 See ECB, Monthly Bulletin, various issues. 
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While it is difficult  to predict with any precision how rapidly, and to what 
extent, the euro will develop as a key international currency, it is clear that the 
euro area is a major player in the world economy, sharing with the United States 
and Japan a large part of the responsibility for managing world economic and 
monetary relations. Regardless of the extent to which the euro may rival the 
dollar as a key international currency, the euro’s exchange rate vis-à-vis the 
dollar and the yen is at the core of the world monetary system. 
 
  A preliminary issue in this respect is whether the introduction of the euro 
will on balance have a stabilizing or a destabilizing effect on the functioning of 
the world monetary system. To address this issue, it may be useful to consider 
the following two closely related questions: 
 
- are excessive external imbalances and exchange rate misalignments 
between the main currency areas be more or less likely to occur in the 
aftermath of the euro? 
-  how effective will the process of international policy coordination be in 
counteracting imbalances or misalignments if they arise? 
 
Regarding the first question, it has been observed that, ceteris paribus, a large 
and relatively closed economic area like the euro area is more likely to gear its 
economic policies to domestic rather than external objectives. Therefore, the 
introduction of the euro can lead to an attitude of “benign neglect” by the 
countries of the euro area vis-à-vis external imbalances and exchange rate 
developments, since these would have a limited impact on euro area output and 
prices. Greater currency volatility and protracted misalignments of the exchange 
rate would result in this scenario. 
 
  However, this argument should not be overstated. First, the dollar-euro 
exchange rate is one of the main indicators the ECB watches, both in view of its 
potential effects on domestic prices and  because of the information it may 
convey about market expectations. Second, the introduction of the euro has per 
se dramatically reduced the impact of movements of the dollar exchange rate on 
euro area countries, which was already limited given the large share of intra-
European trade. The main effect of the euro is one of removing a potential 
source of intra-European exchange rate tensions and of attracting a larger 
number of countries whose exchange rate policy could gravitate on the euro, 
thus further reducing the relative weight of trade with other currency areas. 
 
  
RSC 2001/34 © 2001 Giorgio Gomel  11Another concern is the possibility that, if the euro were to rival the dollar as a 
major international currency, the international monetary system may become 
vulnerable to large portfolio shifts between these two currencies, which would 
result in higher exchange rate instability. It is important to point out that, at least 
in the past, large portfolio shifts out of the US dollar have been mostly 
associated with situations of sharp uncertainty concerning the future orientation 
of monetary and fiscal policies or with episodes of tension in trade negotiations. 
Therefore, maintaining a steady and predictable policy orientation in the key 
currencies stands as the best way to avoid exchange rate volatility. 
 
  In this respect, the institutional framework established for EMU ensures 
that Europe provides a significant contribution to a sound international 
environment. The ECB gears monetary policy to the primary objective of price 
stability. Fiscal policies, whose responsibility remains with the national 
governments, are constrained by the Stability and Growth Pact, to ensure that 
excessive budgetary deficits be avoided. Taken together these elements, if 
correctly applied, make it unlikely that euro area policies become a source of 
international disequilibria. At the same time, the current efforts by European 
institutions to enact sounder structural policies in a variety of fields contribute to 
strengthen the ability of European economies to adjust to external shocks. 
Obviously, for a stable international monetary system, similar efforts are also 
needed in the other two main currency areas. 
 
  As regards the second question, i.e. how European monetary integration 
may affect international policy co-ordination, it has been argued that a 
multipolar, fragmented international monetary system may be inherently less 
stable than the previous one, characterized by the hegemony of the US dollar.
5 A 
historical parallel often used to support this argument is the comparison between 
systems characterized by a clear leader, such as the pre-World War I dominance 
of the British pound or the early post-World War II supremacy of the US dollar, 
and systems such as the one that prevailed in the interwar period, characterized 
by the competition between the pound and the dollar, that proved highly 
vulnerable to economic shocks and to the destabilizing behavior of some of its 
participants.  
 
  However, that historical parallel is only partly valid. First, the pre-EMU 
international monetary system no longer conformed to the model of a hegemon 
or a dominant leader with much smaller followers, since both the Deutsche 
Mark and the yen played a significant international role. Second, the much 
higher degree of economic and financial interdependence than in the past 
implies that the incentives for co-operation are much stronger, as no country 
                                                           
5 See Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989). 
RSC 2001/34 © 2001 Giorgio Gomel  12would be immune from the effects of a world economic crisis. Third, the 
institutions for multilateral surveillance and co-operation established after World 
War II provide the means to identify emerging crises and to co-ordinate policy 
responses. Although these institutions have occasionally proved to be not fully 
adequate and in the recent past the co-ordination of macro-economic policies 
among the main industrial countries has not always lived up to expectations, the 
existence of an established framework for international co-operation is an 
enormous improvement over the situation that, in the interwar period, led to 
conflict, disruption of trade and financial relations, and disastrous policy 
mistakes. 
 
  The future scope for co-operation will depend to a large extent on the 
ability of the key participants to find effective institutional mechanisms. Two 
main scenarios appear possible in this respect. 
 
  A pessimistic scenario postulates that the euro quickly erodes the 
dominant position of the US dollar and the ability and the willingness of the 
United States to act as a leader is reduced. At the same time, particularly in the 
early years of EMU, the euro area may be unable to take up that role, for a 
combination of reasons: because it is too absorbed by the need to sort out its 
own internal functioning; because the ECB is concerned primarily with 
establishing an anti-inflationary reputation; and because the existing EU 
decision making mechanisms are too cumbersome to allow the rapid actions 
needed of a leader.
6 The same reasons that would limit the ability of the two 
main economies to play a leading role could also make it difficult for them to 
co-operate and provide a joint leadership.  
 
  A more positive scenario, and one that I consider more likely, would see a 
gradual increase in the international role of the euro and in parallel of the 
responsibilities assigned to the euro area in the context of the existing 
framework for international policy co-ordination, based on the G7, the IMF and 
the BIS. The reduction in the number of players resulting from EMU could 
make this framework more effective, provided that the European members can 
find a common voice.
7 Over time, progress toward economic and political 
integration, well beyond the single currency, also implying more effective 
decision making, could enable Europe to take over a growing share of 
responsibility in managing international affairs. 
  
                                                           
6 See Henning (1997) and Bergsten (1997). 
7 See Commission of the European Communities (1990), Alogoskoufis and Portes (1991) and 
Kenen (1995). 
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between the two alternative scenarios. The emergence of the euro as a 
competitor to the dominance of the US dollar is a slow process, stemmed by 
inertia. The biggest obstacle is, however, one of a politico-institutional nature, 
i.e. the quest for a “common voice” of the Europeans, or, as the European 
bureaucratic parlance has it, the issue of the “external representation” of the euro 
area. The issue is yet unresolved; so far, ad hoc arrangements have been put in 
place which follow from the fact that EMU is an entity with no equals: it is not 
yet a political union, rather a monetary union where monetary sovereignty is 
shared among national states that retain their  membership unchanged in both 
informal groupings as the G-7 and formal  institutions as the IMF. 
  
The definition of a common European position on international matters is 
a difficult exercise, with the added complexity of reconciling the needs and 
views of the small, non G-7 members of the euro area and of the three big 
European G-7 members which cannot but reflect to some degree G-7 interests or 
requirements. 
 
5.  IMPLICATIONS OF THE EURO FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
 
The extent to which the euro will be able to play an international role will 
depend in large part on its ability to become a pole of attraction for a wider 
economic area, in Europe and beyond. The pre-requisites for this already exist to 
a large extent and will become stronger over time. 
 
  On the real economic side, the euro area, given its large size, is a key 
trade partner of other economic areas. Particularly for the other European 
countries and for countries in neighboring regions (the Mediterranean, the 
Middle East and parts of Africa), the euro area represents by far the largest trade 
partner. Also with countries in other regions, in particular Latin America, trade 
relations are very significant and rapidly growing. On the financial side, the euro 
area has a large and efficient financial market, the degree of integration of which 
(and, therefore, its liquidity, diversification and efficiency) has increased rapidly 
after the introduction of the euro. 
 
There are thus several trade and financial channels through which EMU 
affects economic activity and structure in neighbouring countries. 
  
First, the GDP level in the euro area influences exports and GDP in such 
countries to a degree that depends on these countries’ volume of exports to the 
euro area and the commodity composition of these exports. 
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interest rates: the size of these spillovers will depend on the relative size of 
private capital inflows to recipient countries, the nature of monetary and 
exchange rate policies and restrictions on capital flows. 
  
Third, changes in euro interest rates influence other countries’ balance of 
payments through their external debt service, depending on the share of their 
external debt denominated in euros and at variable interest rates.  
 
Fourth, the euro’s exchange rate vis-à-vis major currencies affects 
exports, GDP and external debt service in neighbouring countries.
8 
  
In addition, one should mention structural ramifications of EMU on trade 
and capital flows. On trade, the implementation of Association agreements by 
Mediterranean nations with the EU which provide for a sizeable reduction in 
these countries’ trade protection, should induce a gradual transfer of resources to 
areas where these countries enjoy comparative advantage and lead to increased 
trade between these countries and the EU.  
 
EMU may also enhance capital flows to emerging market economies. 
First, deeper and more liquid capital markets in Europe tend to lower borrowing 
costs for both countries in the euro area and for countries that raise funds in 
euro-denominated instruments. Second, EMU allows euro-area institutions such 
as insurance companies and pension funds to shift some of their portfolios into 
emerging market investments as constraints imposed by currency matching 
requirements on foreign-currency-denominates investments are eased. Third, 
emerging market economies could benefit from direct and portfolio capital 
inflows if the convergence of asset returns in Europe leads global investors to 
increase their emerging market holdings in order to diversify across countries 
with a wider range of risk and return characteristics or with different cyclical 
positions. In sum, EMU is likely to intensify a number of portfolio effects that 
should concur to fostering capital flows from the EU to emerging or developing 
economies. Among these, those that stand to benefit most from these portfolio 
shifts are those with more open capital accounts and developed domestic 
securities markets, with relatively low inflation rates and close links with the 
EU. 
  
The extent to which the euro is important to neighbouring countries 
depends on the nature of their specific economic and political ties to the euro 
area. For the sake of simplicity, it is useful to distinguish two cases: i) European 
countries that are in the process of becoming EU members, the so-called 
                                                           
8  For estimates of these effects, see Feldman R. at al. (1998). 
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nations. 
  
The countries that are in the process of becoming EU members or intend 
to do so in the future have a strong incentive to:  
 
-  strengthen their economic and financial ties with the euro area. Essential 
part of the process of joining the EU is the mutual elimination of trade 
barriers and the adaptation of the regulatory environment to that of the 
single European market; 
-  link their currencies to the euro. Integration with the EU also requires a 
stable macro-economic policy framework. To the extent that new entrants 
need to stabilize their economies and converge with the euro area with the 
aim of adopting the euro, they may find it useful to set their exchange rate 
policies with reference to the euro. The nature of the appropriate exchange 
rate regime would depend, for each country, on its specific situation, in 
particular the degree of convergence already achieved; 
-  hold official reserves in euro. To the extent that a country’s exchange rate 
policy is defined with reference to the euro, larger euro reserves would 
normally be needed for intervention purposes. 
 
Other nations with close economic and historical ties to EU countries, for 
instance in the Mediterranean area, may also have incentives to increase their 
use of the euro and to strengthen ties with the euro area, although for partly 
different reasons. In particular:  
 
- increasing trade and investment flows as a part of their process of 
integration in the world economy will be essential to their development 
strategy. Since trade with the euro area would represent a large share of 
their total trade, it would be normal that in the future much of it is invoiced 
in euro. To a growing extent, this may apply also to internationally-traded 
commodities; 
-  those countries can also be expected to have a strong interest in tapping 
euro financial markets, both to finance their trade relations with the euro 
area and because of the new opportunities for risk diversification that they 
would offer; 
-  some countries which until 1998 had been linking their currencies to the 
French franc or the Deutsche Mark naturally tend to continue to do so with 
the euro. Other countries may  follow them, to varying degrees. For 
example, countries which had been pegging exchange rates to a basket 
including the US dollar and the Deutsche Mark may not only replace the 
latter with the euro but also give it a larger weight; 
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reference to the euro, they could be motivated to increase the share of euros 
in their official reserves in order to diversify their composition. 
 
 
                                                          
6.  THE EURO AND THE MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
 
In this section we deal with the economic, financial and currency relationships 
the Mediterranean partner countries
9 are likely to develop with EMU nations 
with the inception of the euro and as EMU progresses towards deeper 
integration. 
 
6.1     Trade 
 
Mediterranean countries’ trade is strongly concentrated in Euroland and has 
been given further impetus by the adoption of a single currency. Euroland can be 
seen to represent the hub for a large area comprising the Mediterranean basin 
and Eastern Europe that tends to gravitate around it. EU countries’ exports to the 
Mediterranean nations have increased at yearly rates of 6.3 per cent, at current 
prices, in the period from 1985 to 1992 and of 8 per cent in the period running 
from 1993 to 1998. EU countries’ imports from the same nations have increased 
at rates of 6 and 4 per cent per annum in the same subperiods. The EU 
represents both a prominent export market and a leading supplier of imports: it 
accounts
10 for over 52 per cent of those countries’ exports as compared with 12 
per cent accounted for by the United States; the Mediterranean countries’ import 
shares are roughly similar. In the Maghreb the share of the EU exceeds 60 per 
cent of the countries’ external trade.  
 
As a consequence, higher levels of activity in Europe brought about by 
EMU (by way of eliminating currency risk and reducing transaction costs) are 
bound to have beneficial spillover effects for the neighboring region. These are 
obviously difficult to quantify. According to IMF estimates, performed on a 
slightly different subset of countries, a 1 per cent increase in real GDP in Europe 
is associated with an increase of MENA
11 exports to the EU of about 2.7 per 
cent. Given the share of EU exports in the total trade of the region, this effect 
would boost MENA countries’ exports by an average 1 per cent, ranging from 
 
9 12 countries in the region: Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, Morocco, 
the Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey. 
10 Average 1995-97 data. 
11 The analysis is conducted in terms of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. 
This includes Algeria, Egypt, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, 
Syria and Tunisia. See Feldman R. et al. (1998). 
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increase of about 0.2 per cent in MENA countries’ output.  
 
For countries that are prominent exporters of raw materials, agricultural 
commodities, and especially petroleum products, the dollar will remain the 
prevailing currency of denomination. But, as other countries increasingly 
diversify exports towards finished or semifinished industrial products, there will 
be a growing tendency to denominate trade in euro, reducing the current 
disparity between the share of the euro area in terms of direction of trade and the 
share of the euro with respect to invoicing. Accordingly, Mediterranean 
countries are expected to increase their demand for euros; in the longer run, the 
euro could also play an increasing role for intra-Mediterranean area trade as well 
as for transactions between the region and other non-EU neighboring countries. 
As concerns invisible transactions, such as migrants' remittances, the 
denomination of those will depend on the place of origin: migrants to Europe 
will remit in euros, while migrants to the Gulf countries will continue to remit in 
dollars or in local currency. 
 
 
6.2    Currency composition of external debt 
 
There is a noticeable mismatch between the Mediterranean countries’ pattern of 
trade and the currency composition of their external liabilities. While the share 
of the EU in terms of these countries’ direction of trade is very large, most of 
their financial liabilities are denominated in US dollars or other non-euro 
currencies (Table 5). Such mismatch will be only gradually corrected. Terms of 
contracts on the existing stock of debt have obviously not been altered by  the 
adoption of the euro, but fresh external borrowing by Mediterranean countries 
has been attracted to the pan-European capital markets by the combination of 
lower transaction costs, lower interest spreads and the increased demand for 
financial assets in euros. 
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Currency composition of long-term external debt, 1998 
(in percent of total) 
 
 EU currencies US$  Yen  Other 
Algeria 22,8  44,8  12,1  20,3 
Egypt 30,6  37,2  12,5  19,7 
Jordan 22,5  30,4  23,0  24,1 
Iran 12,1  75,0  7,8  5,1 
Lebanon 8,1  37,7 0,0  54,2 
Morocco 26,7 37,9  2,7 32,7 
Syria 3,5  84,4  3,1  9,0 
Tunisia 16,4  40,2  15,2  28,2 
Turkey 24,7  51,7  15,8 7,8 
 
       Source: World Bank, Global Development Finance, 2000 
 
6.3    Foreign exchange reserves 
 
Data on the currency composition of foreign exchange reserves is available only 
for few selected countries: in Egypt and Lebanon the US dollar is predominant, 
while in Morocco and Tunisia the euro prevails.  
 
Conjectures can be made about future broad trends, at least in qualitative 
terms. A number of factors point to a process of diversification of reserves in 
favor of the euro. With growing economic integration between the EU and the 
countries that have entered into Association agreements with it and in view of 
the establishment of the Euro-Mediterranean free trade area the euro will play a 
more prominent role in external trade and the share of euro in foreign currency 
reserves will increase. Moreover, trade in euros should increase as trade 
invoicing more accurately reflects trade patterns and the share of euro-
denominated liabilities will increase given the breadth and liquidity of European 
capital markets; these developments should result in larger holdings of reserves 
in euros. 
 
6.4    Exchange rate regimes and policies 
 
Currently, Mediterranean countries exhibit a multitude of exchange rate regimes 
(see Table 6). A first group that includes Turkey, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan 
displays market-determined exchange rates which are linked more or less rigidly 
through fixed pegs or crawling bands to a currency basket. Exchange restrictions 
or capital controls are nearly absent. In a second group of countries – Morocco, 
Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, Malta, Cyprus, Egypt and Algeria – foreign exchange 
markets are less developed and exchange rates are largely driven by central bank 
intervention, despite recent reforms which have introduced interbank currency 
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determined by demands and supplies. Exchange rate regimes within this group 
range from fixed to crawling pegs to managed floats. Lastly, a third group 
comprises countries where administered regimes prevail regulating foreign 
exchange and capital movements. Exchange restrictions abound. In two cases – 
Iran and Syria – dual or multiple exchange rates prevail which entail an implicit 









PEGGING TO:  EXCHANGE 
RATE 
STRUCTURE 
Turkey MF -  Unitary 
Israel CrB  Basket  Unitary 
Lebanon
 (1) CPA  -  Unitary 
Jordan CPA  SDR
 (2) Unitary 
Morocco CPA  Basket  Unitary 
Tunisia CrP -  Unitary 
Saudi Arabia  PER  SDR
(2) Unitary 
Malta CPA  Basket  Unitary 
Cyprus PER  Euro  Unitary 
Egypt CPA  US  $  Multiple 
Algeria MF -  Unitary 
Iran CPA  -  Dual 
Syrian Arab  
Republic 
CPA US  $  Multiple 
Libyan Arab  
Republic 
PER SDR  Dual 
 
Source: IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, 
2000. 
 
Acronyms: MF = Managed Floating with No Preannounced Path for the Exchange 
Rate; PER = Pegged Exchange Rate within Horizontal Bands; CPA= Conventional 
Pegged Arrangements; CrB = Crawling Band; CrP = Crawling Peg. 
 
(1)  The exchange rate is market determined but is de facto pegged to the US $. 
(2)  The currency is officially pegged to the SDR, in practice to the US $. 
 
 
The choice of the degree of flexibility of an exchange rate regime depends on a 
number of structural characteristics of the economy, such as the size and degree 
of openness of the economy, the geographical concentration of trade, the degree 
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of the “optimum currency area” argument a fixed exchange rate regime is to be 
preferred, the smaller and more open the economy, the less diversified the 
production and export structure, the higher the geographic concentration of 
trade, the higher the degree of factor mobility and the more prevalent domestic 
nominal shocks. It would be obvious then to suggest that Mediterranean 
countries that largely share those features would be better off pegging their 
currencies to that of their main trading partner, the EU. 
 
On the other hand the actual existence of a variety of exchange rate 
arrangements belies a diversity of policy preferences regarding exchange rate 
policy. Different exchange rate policies in turn imply divergent paths and 
performances of the real exchange rate. Countries that maintain strong links to 
currency baskets such as Morocco tend to move in step with the euro given its 
large weight in the basket. For countries with pegs or predominant links to the 
US dollar such as Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Jordan, the exchange rate displays 
great variation relative to the euro. 
 
For the countries that are linked to the euro through currency baskets the 
implementation of exchange rate policy to manage external competitiveness 
need not be changed in view of changes in the value of the euro. These countries 
depend on the EU market and will therefore wish to continue following the euro 
relatively closely so as to maintain competitiveness in European markets. 
 
For the countries with currencies closely linked to the dollar, shifts in the 
valuation of the euro could be more worrisome, since such shifts could imply 
large changes in their competitiveness in European markets. In regard to 
exports, euro fluctuations would be primarily important for Syria and Egypt, 
where EU markets account for 56 and 44 per cent of total exports, respectively. 
For the oil exporting countries pegged to the dollar, export prices are determined 
in world markets, and competitiveness is relatively unaffected by exchange rate 
movements. In regard to imports, the depreciating trend of the euro since its 
inception has led to a loss of competitiveness against euro-area exporters. These 
effects have been important for most countries pegged to the dollar, where 
imports from the EU range from 34 per cent of total imports (Jordan) to 66 per 
cent (Libya). 
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trade shares with the EU countries, there may be merit in considering linking to 
a broader basket or switching to a more flexible exchange rate policy that might 
better preserve relative price stability against European markets. This decision 
will depend on a variety of factors including the effectiveness of exchange rate 
adjustment in bringing about relative price movements, the nature of the shocks 
affecting the region and EMU, and the currency composition of merchandise 
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